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THE FULCRUM POINT OF EQUAL ACCESS
TO JUSTICE: LEGAL AND NONLEGAL

INSTITUTIONS OF REMEDY
Rebecca L. Sandefur*
"Equal access to justice" would mean that different groups in a society
would have similar chances of obtaining similar resolutions to similar
kinds of civil justice problems. If people had equal access to justice, a
society's institutions of remedy would work to equalize how they
handled their civil justice problems and to ensure that similarproblems
were resolved similarly, even when different kinds of people-whether
rich or poor, men or women, of any race or ethnicity--experienced
them. When justice scholars and practicing attorneys address the
problem of equalizing access to civil justice, they often begin by
thinking about expanding access to law. But, when members of the
public confront problems that raise issues in civil law, they do not share
the same law-centric perspective of these attorneys and academics. In
the United States and other developed nations, most civil justice
problems are never taken to law. When one examines how people
actually handle their civil justice problems, one observes both a
widespread resignation to these problems and an enormous variety of
attempted remedies, a minority of which involve the explicit use of law.
A comparative analysis of the design and function of both legal and
nonlegal institutions of remedy for civil justice problems reveals
potential solutions to the problem of equalizing access to justice in an
unequal society. By stepping back from law, we can expand and
equalize access to substantive justice by selectively redesigning
institutions of remedy so that they are remedial and give members of
unequal groups more common and more equal experiences with their
justice problems. This innovative approach relies on and bolsters the
notion that access to justice is for everyone.

Assistant Professor of Sociology and Assistant Professor (by courtesy) of Law
at
Stanford University. This paper was presented at the "Access to Justice: It's Not for Everyone"
Symposium held at Loyola Law School Los Angeles, California, on February 6, 2009. Parts of
the empirical analysis were made possible by Professor Pascoe Pleasence and the staff at the
Legal Services Research Centre who generously shared data.
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I. INTRODUCTION

When justice scholars and practicing attorneys address the
problem of access to civil justice, they often begin by thinking about
expanding access to law. Such an expansion could involve creating a
more comprehensive legal aid system that broadens the range of civil
justice problems for which people can receive free or subsidized
legal assistance.' Or, it could involve making civil legal assistance
more generous by increasing the share of the population that is
eligible to receive effective subsidies for lawyers' services. 2 It could
also involve extending support for people utilizing the court system
without the assistance of attorneys, for example by providing greater
funding and more staff for court-based self-help programs. 3
But when members of the public confront problems that raise
issues in civil law, they do not share the same law-centric perspective
of these attorneys and academics. In the United States and other
developed nations, most civil justice problems are never taken to
law. When one examines how people actually handle their civil
justice problems, one observes both a widespread resignation to these
problems and an enormous variety of attempted remedies, a minority
of which involve the explicit use of law. 4
In this Article, I argue that the diversity of public responses to
civil justice problems, including both legal and nonlegal responses, is
the appropriate terrain for theoretical and empirical inquiries about
access to justice. Drawing on the insights provided by this

1. See Francis Regan, Why Do Legal Aid Services Vary Between Societies? Re-examining
the Impact of Welfare States and Legal Families, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF LEGAL AID:
COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL STUDIES 187, tbl.8.1 (Francis Regan et al. eds., 1999).

2. Id.
3. The State of California, for example, has a large number of court-based self-help centers
that provide information to self-represented litigants. See Fact Sheet from the Administrative
Office for the Courts, Programs for Self-Represented Litigants (Feb. 2009), http://www.court
info.ca.gov/selfhelp/pressroom/documents/summary.pdf. The California Courts Self-Help Center
provides assistance to self-represented litigants who are pursuing claims or defending against
them in the state courts. California Courts, Self-Help Center, http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/
selfhelp/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2009). See the Self-Represented Litigant Network ("SRLN") for
more general information about the self-help movement. Self-Represented Litigation Network,
Welcome Page, http://www.srln.org/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2009). The SRLN describes itself as
"an open and growing grouping of organizations and working groups dedicated to fulfilling the
promise of a justice system that works for all, including those who cannot afford lawyers and are
therefore forced to go to court on their own. The Network brings together courts and access to
justice organizations in support of innovations in services for the self represented." Id.
4. See infra Part 11.

Summer 2009]

INSTITUTIONS OFREMEDY

broadened perspective, I identify potential solutions to the problem
of equalizing access to justice in an unequal society.
For the purposes of this Article, "equal access to justice" would
mean that different groups in a society would have similar chances of
obtaining similar resolutions to similar kinds of civil justice
problems. If people had equal access to justice, a society's
institutions of remedy would work to equalize how people handled
their civil justice problems, and to ensure that similar problems were
resolved similarly, even when different kinds of people-whether
rich or poor, men or women, of any race or ethnicity--experienced
them. This is a practical understanding of access to justice that
focuses on public experience with justice problems and institutions.
Through a comparative analysis of the design and function of
institutions of remedy, including the public's experience with those
institutions, this Article identifies areas of innovation that policy
makers could explore should they be ready to commit to the notion
that access to justice is for everyone.
II. REAL-LIFE EXPERIENCE WITH CIVIL JUSTICE PROBLEMS

In every market society studied, contact with civil justice
problems 5 is widespread. 6 Many of these problems are quite
mundane and involve the practicalities of everyday life in such
societies. These justice problems exist at the "intersection of civil
law and everyday adversity."7 People have difficulties paying bills,
concerns that their property taxes are too high, trouble getting
landlords or condo associations to make repairs, arguments with
neighbors about the location of property lines, difficulty reaching
5. A civil justice problem is one that has civil legal aspects and raises civil legal issues,
though the person who has the problem may never think of as it a legal problem and may never
take legal action to try to resolve it. Professor Dame Hazel Genn terms such problems
"justiciable events."

HAZEL GENN ET AL., PATHS TO JUSTICE: WHAT PEOPLE DO AND THINK

ABOUT GOING TO LAW 12 (Hart Publ'g 1999). Professor Genn's term is illuminating: it
emphasizes the fact that while these problems have legal aspects, legal consequences, and
(potentially) legal solutions, they may never be understood or treated as legal problems. Id.
6. See Rebecca L. Sandefur, Access to Civil Justice and Race, Classand Gender Inequality,
34 ANN. REV. Soc. 339, 346 (2008) (Karen S. Cook & Douglas S. Massey eds., 2008). Civil
justice studies reviewed in the article include those from the democratic market societies of
Australia, Canada, England and Wales, Japan, Scotland, the United States, and the post-socialist
transition society of China. Id.
7. Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Importance of Doing Nothing: Everyday Problems and
Responses of Inaction, in TRANSFORMING LIVES: LAW AND SOCIAL PROCESS 112, 113 (Pascoe

Pleasence et al. eds., 2007).
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agreement with ex-partners about child custody and visitation, and
quarrels with service providers, to name only a few. 8 A recent
compilation of national surveys of public experience with civil
justice problems finds that, across eight market democracies studied
between the early 1990s and the mid-2000s, between 19.5 percent
and 52 percent of those surveyed reported experiencing at least one
civil justice problem in the time period specified by the surveys,
which ranged from twelve months to five years, depending on the
study.9
Civil justice is not a problem only for the poor; civil justice
problems are everybody's problems. Figure 1 reports the prevalence
of civil justice problems concerning money or housing in the United
States in 1992 and provides an illustration of the reach of these
issues. The data presented report on the experiences of two
subgroups of the US population: people eligible for means-tested
civil legal aid funded by the federal government, '0 and people
ineligible for this aid but still earning less than $60,000 per year. As
the figure shows, justice problems involving housing, finance, and
livelihood were common, with at least 12 percent of both poor and
moderate-income households reporting that they had experienced at
least one of these problems during the past year. Similar kinds of
civil justice problems are similarly widespread in other countries. 'l
For example, an analysis of data from the England and Wales Civil
and Social Justice Survey of 2004 found that all three major social
class groups experienced similar rates of each of five different kinds
of civil justice problems: livelihood troubles, troubles with other

8. See id. at 121-22; Sandefur, supranote 6, at 341-43.
9. Currie, infra note 13, tbl.1. Currie reviewed studies from Canada, England and Wales,
Japan, New Zealand, Northern Ireland, the Netherlands, Scotland, and the United States. Id.
10. In the United States, people whose household incomes are below 125 percent of the
federal poverty level are eligible for Legal Service Corporation-funded civil legal assistance.
ABA CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERVICES AND THE PUBLIC, LEGAL NEEDS AND CIVIL JUSTICE, A
SURVEY OF AMERICANS: MAJOR FINDINGS FROM THE COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL NEEDS STUDY 7
(1994), available at http://www.abanet.orgllegalservices/downloads/sclaid/legalneedstudy.pdf
[hereinafter LEGAL NEEDS STUDY]. Because the ABA study largely sampled households with
telephones, the findings do not represent the experiences of homeless people, people living in
group homes or other institutional settings, and people who did not have land-line telephones. Id.
at 12, 29.
11. Rebecca L. Sandefur, Civil Justice and Social Class Inequality: The Socioeconomic
Impact of Civil Justice Problems (2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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sources of household income, troubles with debts and credit, troubles
with housing security, and troubles with housing conditions. 2
Although studies reveal that different societies provide diverse
routes for resolving civil justice problems, they also reveal that the
majority of problems never make it to law, lawyers, or the civil
justice system. 13 A pattern of pervasive alegality characterizes how
ordinary people across societies handle their own everyday civil
justice problems.
The reasons for this alegality are more subtle than might first
seem to be the case. Certainly, one factor behind the pattern is the
high cost of legal services. In some societies, lawyers are simply too
expensive for people to afford on their own, and there is little
subsidy for citizens' use of lawyers' services. 14 However, when one
looks more deeply at how people actually respond to their own civil
justice problems, one sees that cost is not the primary mechanism
creating the pattern of alegality.
The legal nature of any given civil justice problem is socially
constructed. The characterization of a specific situation as a legal
problem reflects not only the thoughts and actions of the people who
experience the troubles, but also those of the friends, neighbors,
family members, and service providers to whom they bring their
troubles. 15 The transformation of a civil justice problem into a legal
problem is the result of a complex process in which the cost of legal
services is only one factor among many. 16
One reason to suspect that alegality is caused by more than
simply the cost of legal services is that people sometimes do nothing
about serious civil justice problems, even when taking action would

12. Id.
13. See, e.g., Herbert M. Kritzer, To Lawyer or Not to Lawyer: Is That the Question?, 5 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 875, 879 fig.2, 896-98 figs.12, 13 & 14 (2008) (compiling findings
based on studies in Australia, Canada, England and Wales, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
and the United States); see also GENN ET AL., supra note 5, at 83-84, 102-03 figs.3.2 & 3.3;
PASCOE PLEASENCE, CAUSES OF ACTION: CIVIL LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 104 fig.3.3 (2006);
Ab Currie, The Legal Problems of Everyday Life, 12 SOC. CRIME, L. & DEVIANCE 9 (2009);
Sandefur, supra note 7, at 114 figi.
14. See, e.g., LEGAL NEEDS STUDY, supra note 10, at 28.
15. See William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes:
Naming, Blaming, Claiming ... , 15 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 631, 644-47 (1980-81); Leon H.
Mayhew, Institutions of Representation: Civil Justice and the Public, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 401,
403 (1975).
16. See Felstiner, supra note 15; Mayhew, supra note 15.
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cost them no money. 17 For example, in the United States, people
frequently opt for inaction-that is, they do nothing about serious
problems-even when possible solutions would involve no out-ofpocket cost. 18 A study of how Americans handle common civil
justice problems involving money and housing found that they
frequently did not try to resolve these problems, even when problems
involved serious threats to their physical safety, creditworthiness,
ability to pay their bills, or household solvency. 19 When people
explained why they took no action, they seldom attributed the
inaction to financial costs. 20 Rather, people explained that they did
nothing because they were embarrassed about a problem or ashamed
of having it. 2 Alternatively, they expressed concern that they had
too little power to achieve their goals with respect to a problem. 22
They also described how their inaction was a fruit of past
experiences with trying to take action: people learnedto do nothing
about serious civil justice problems.23 In particular, they described
how they learned to fear the negative consequences of taking action,
such as retaliation. 24 They also described how they had learned to
avoid taking action as a way to express gratitude for offenders'
previous good behavior. For example, they would refrain from filing
complaints against landlords who failed to make repairs because they
believed that the landlords' past good behavior made them deserving
of forbearance. 25 People also described how they had come to resign
themselves to current problems because past attempts to resolve
similar problems had been both fruitless and frustrating.26 In sum,
people are inactive in the face of serious problems that present
potentially far-reaching negative consequences for a wide variety of
reasons. A lack of money to hire help-legal or otherwise-is one
reason. " However, it is only one reason, and often not the primary
17. Sandefur, supra note 7, at 114-15.
18. Id.
19. Id. attbl.1.
20. Id. at 123.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 123-24.
23. Id. at 125.
24. Id. at 124.
25. Id.at 124-25.
26. Id. at 125-26.
27. Id.at 116.
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one in people's own accounts of why they handle their problems as
they do.
There is a second reason to suspect that the financial cost of
using lawyers' services is not the only factor affecting how people
respond to civil justice problems: people often do not consult lawyers
even when lawyers' services are relatively inexpensive. 2 Consider
the example of England and Wales. For many years, legal aid has
been available to much of the population through a "Judicare
system." 29 In such a system, eligible persons receive a voucher from
the government that fully or partially funds their purchase of
lawyers' services from the private practice bar. 3 Yet, the existence
of civil legal aid as a formal entitlement of citizenship does not lead
to the use of lawyers for the majority of civil justice troubles. 3
Recent work using the England and Wales Civil and Social Justice
Survey of 2004 found that people took only 10 percent of "difficult
to solve" 32 civil justice problems involving money or housing to
lawyers, courts, or tribunals.33 In a context where there was, at least
in principle, widespread access to lawyers, there was hardly
widespread recourse to them. Rather, people responded to these
problems in other ways: of the problems under consideration, 85
percent were addressed by taking action through nonlegal avenues.34
Thus, turning to law should not be seen as the exclusive or even
the predominant means through which people in market democracies
attempt to handle their civil justice problems. Rather, turning to law
should be seen as part of a richly textured terrain of possible
responses and remedies. If we wish to expand or-even more
ambitiously-to equalize access to justice, we must look to the
breadth of this terrain.
28. See infra Part IV.
29. For example, during the period between 2001 and 2005, 41 percent to 46 percent of the
population was eligible for full or partial subsidy of the cost of their retention of private practice
legal services for covered problems. ADAM GRIFFITH, ADVICE SERVICES ALLIANCE, DRAMATIC
DROP IN CIVIL LEGAL AID ELIGIBILITY 1 (2008), http://www.asauk.org.uk/fileLibrary/pdf/
Dramaticdrop.pdf.
30. Alan Paterson provides a useful description of the Judicare model and alternative
schemes of legal aid. Alan Paterson, Legal Aid at the Cross Roads, 10 CIV. JUST. Q. 124, 126
(1991).
31. See GENN, supra note 13; PLEASENCE, supra note 13.
32. PLEASENCE, supra note 13.
33. Sandefur, supra note 11.
34. Id.
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PREVALENCE OF THREE TYPES OF CIVIL JUSTICE PROBLEMS
AMONG AMERICAN HOUSEHOLDS, BY HOUSEHOLD INCOME, 1992
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10%
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6%

0 Moderateincome
Households
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2%
0%
Housing
Problems

Financial
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Types of Civil Justice Problems
Prevalence rates represent all civil justice problems per household in
1992. "Housing problems" include problems with housing conditions,
housing security, and the transfer of real property.
"Financial
problems" include problems with personal finances, credit, and
consumer matters. "Livelihood problems" include employment-related
problems and problems with public benefits. 35
FIGURE 1

35. LEGAL NEEDS STUDY, supra note 10.
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III. INSTITUTIONS OF REMEDY FOR CIVIL JUSTICE PROBLEMS

Market democracies, such as the United States, design
institutions of remedy for civil justice problems in diverse ways. 36
Some institutional designs encourage people to take action about
civil justice problems, while others encourage people to lump and do
nothing about them.37 Similarly, some institutional designs moderate
or reduce inequality in access to justice, while other designs
encourage inequality.38 This Part of the Article develops an analytic
typology of institutions of remedy. Part IV will use this typology to
guide an empirical analysis supporting the argument that these
institutions shape people's action and inaction in response to their
civil justice problems. Figure 2 represents this typology.
A. FormalInstitutions of Remedy
The spectrum of possible solutions to civil justice problems
includes those provided by formal institutions of remedy, institutions
empowered to provide authoritative resolution to civil justice
problems. In market democracies, the most well-known of these are
courts and tribunals, accessed through lawsuits and litigation. These
legal institutions are assisted by lawyers who not only represent
actual litigants but also screen potential litigants by deciding which
cases to take and which to refuse.39 In addition to these legal
institutions, market democracies also provide a whole set of formal
institutions of remedy that are nonlegal in a very specific sense: these
institutions do not involve any explicit contact between members of
the public and legal organizations, formal legal processes, or legal
staff.
In short, nonlegal formal institutions of remedy are
authoritative, but without requiring public contact with courts,
tribunals, lawsuits, litigation, or lawyers.
36. See infra Part IV and fig.3.
37. See Marc Galanter, Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of

Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC'Y REV. 95, 124-25 (1974). Galanter notes that some "lumpers" are
unable to take action because they lack information or access, while others choose not to take
action because the gain is too minimal or the cost too large. Id. The "lumpers" also include
government actors who are limited by incomplete information, availability of resources, and
policies regarding priorities. See id. Thus, to the extent some institutional structures may
exacerbate or ameliorate these costs and benefits, they may alter behavior.
38. See infra Part IV.
39. See Sandefur, supra note 6, at 348-49.
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INSTITUTIONS OF REMEDY FOR CIVIL JUSTICE PROBLEMS
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FIGURE 2
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Nonlegal formal institutions of remedy take a variety of forms.
A prominent manifestation is the state or federal administrative
agencies that regulate specific industries and are empowered to
respond authoritatively to some of the public's civil justice
problems. 40 For example, a person who finds herself in a dispute
with a bank that she believes has engaged in unfair or deceptive acts
may be able to resolve the dispute by filing a complaint with the
Federal Reserve System. 4 In addition to state and federal agencies,
there are also local regulatory agencies that perform similar
functions, such as the enforcement of housing codes. 42
A second prominent manifestation of nonlegal institutions of
remedy is the government ombudsmen offices in some countries.4 3
The primary purpose of these offices is not to regulate industries on
matters like intra-industry competition or compliance with
environmental laws, but rather specifically to investigate and
authoritatively resolve the problems that individual members of the
public report. For example, disputes about bills, debts, and contract

40. See, e.g., Jeanne M. Hogarth & Maureen P. English, Consumer Complaints andRedress:
An Important Mechanism for Protecting and Empowering Consumers, 26 INT'L J. CONSUMER
STUD. 217, 217 (2002) (noting that U.S. federal law requires certain federal agencies to maintain
consumer complaint programs and discussing one such program).
41. Id. at 218. In the United States, one responsibility of the Federal Reserve System is "the
investigation and resolution of complaints filed by consumers against state member banks,
primarily complaints that are related to the consumer credit and financial services area." Id. This
organization cannot and does not resolve all of the problems that the public presents to it. A
recent study found that more than half of complaints received by the Federal Reserve System
were not about member banks and so were referred on to other agencies. See id. at 220. Of
complaints that were handled by the Federal Reserve between October 1999 and September 2001,
about two fifths (41.4 percent) were resolved in favor of the complainant. See id. at 222 tbl.1.
Complaints that "involved a regulated activity (as opposed to an unregulated activity, such as a
customer service issue)" were more likely to be resolved in the complainant's favor. Id. at 222,
224 tbl.3.
42. See, e.g., H. Laurence Ross, Housing Code Enforcement as Law in Action, 17 LAW &
POL'Y 133, 134-35 (1995). Across localities in the United States, housing condition problems
sometimes fall within the jurisdiction of municipalities, and at other times they fall under state
health codes. Id. As with problems involving financial services, not all of the housing problems
that the public perceives meet with resolution. An empirical study of housing code enforcement
in three cities in the United States concluded that "[a]lthough visible and dangerous violations
receive priority in enforcement generally, even these conditions may be tolerated" by authorities
when the owners of rental housing cannot afford to pay for the repairs necessary to bring it up to
code. Id. at 157.
43. See infra Part IV.
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terms, as well as complaints about service, can be investigated and
resolved authoritatively by ombudsmen."
A third form in which these nonlegal institutions of remedy
appear is public compensation corporations that handle individuals'
claims of redress for personal injuries. 45
These government
corporations may be funded through taxes or public insurance
payments. 46 They receive and resolve claims seeking compensation
for common injuries that are often the result of accidents, such as
workplace injuries, professional errors, auto accidents, and injuries
incurred in the use of facilities.47
In societies where such
corporations exist, they perform the same kind of work that a legal
liability system (supported by private insurance companies and a
personal injury bar) performs in other societies.
B. Auxiliaries
In market democracies, formal institutions of remedy are
complemented by a whole set of auxiliary providers who are third
parties with respect to the public's civil justice problems. Some
auxiliaries work apart from formal institutions of remedy by
providing problem-resolution strategies that, although not
authoritative, may nevertheless be very effective from the public's
perspective. Aggrieved members of the public may seek resolution
to their consumer problems by writing to media action lines, or by
complaining publicly in letters to the editor. In addition, they may
44. The United Kingdom's original ombudsman for financial services was created
specifically "to meet the needs of consumers for rapid, effective and cheap redress" of their
problems with financial services providers such as banks, investment advisors, and the like. See
Jeremy Mitchell, Ombudsman Schemes for FinancialServices in the UK.: A Consumer View, 15
J. CONSUMER STUD. & HOME ECON. 299, 299 (1991).
45. See New Zealand Accident Compensation Corp., Introduction to ACC,
http://www.acc.co.nz/about-acc/overview-of-acc/introduction-to-acc/index.htm (last visited Sept.
13, 2009) [hereinafter Introduction to A CC].
46. See, e.g., New Zealand Accident Compensation Corp., How We're Funded,
(last visited Sept.
http://www.acc.co.nz/about-acc/overview-of-acc/how-were-funded/index.htm
13, 2009).
47. Id.
48. For example, New Zealand's Accident Compensation Corporation "provide[s]
comprehensive, no-fault personal injury cover for all New Zealand residents and visitors to New
Zealand." On account of this expansive coverage, individuals who suffer a personal injury while
in New Zealand cannot "sue for personal injury, other than for exemplary damages."
Introduction to ACC, supra note 45.
49. See Michael C. Mattice, Media in the Middle: A Study of the Mass Media Complaint
Managers, in No ACCESS TO LAW: ALTERNATIVES TO THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM 485,
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take their consumer complaints to the Better Business Bureau.5 °
Moreover, community mediation and conciliation services can help
disputing parties work out various types of problems without either
side taking recourse to formal institutions of remedy. "' Finally, the
public can also take concerns to their elected political

representatives.52
Other auxiliaries work in conjunction with formal institutions of
remedy by providing

support to

people who

pursue formal

resolution. These auxiliaries may provide information or advice
regarding what courses of action exist and how to follow them, and
may refer interested parties to other auxiliary service providers, to
formal institutions of remedy, or to lawyers. "
A society's institutions of remedy provide a large share of the

total solutions available to the public for handling civil justice
problems. The design of these institutions varies considerably across
market democracies. When people experience justice problems, they
can use only those routes to solution that they recognize as available,

including the options of doing nothing and trying to resolve a
problem on their own. Through a comparative institutional analysis,
this Article argues that not only do institutions of remedy shape what
485-86 (Laura Nader ed., 1980) (providing an extensive discussion of "action lines" through the
use of four case studies).
50. The Better Business Bureau is a membership organization to which businesses pay dues
in return for the Bureau's provision of services, including the resolution of complaints by the
public against member businesses. Dennis E. Garrett, The Debate Regarding the Better Business
Bureau's Commitment to Neutrality: An Analysis of Local Better Business Bureau Boards of
Directors, 36 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 22, 23-25 (2007). See generally Marian
Eaton, The Better Business Bureau: "The Voice of the People in the Marketplace," in NO
ACCESS TO LAW, supra note 49, at 233, 240 (examining the extent to which the BBB resolves
consumer issues and its reasons for doing so).
51. See Larry Ray, Community Mediation Centers: Delivering First-ClassServices to LowIncome People for the Past Twenty Years, 15 MEDIATION Q. 71, 72 (1997). These kinds of
organizations receive their clients through a variety of routes. Some of the problems that these
organizations handle are referred to them by courts. Many other problems come from "walk-in"
clients who arrive without previous contact with formal legal institutions. Id. at 73-75. For
example, Project Sentinel, a non-profit organization based in Northern California, offers
counseling, mediation, and complaint resolution services to those affected by housing-related
issues, with an aim "towards resolution of conflicts outside the court system." Project Sentinel,
About Us, http://www.housing.org/about-us.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2009).
52. See generally Angela Karikas, Solving Problems in Philadelphia:An Ethnography of a
Congressional District Office, in No ACCESS TO LAW, supra note 49, at 345, 350-371
(examining the costs and benefits associated with a legislator's devotion to resolving the
problems of individual constituents).
53. See, e.g., Gregory Wilson & Elizabeth Brydolf, Grass Roots Solutions: San Francisco
Consumer Action, in No ACCESS TO LAW, supra note 49, at 417, 419.
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people do about their problems by providing routes to solution, but
they also shape differences in how people handle their problems by
providing routes to solution that are more or less accessible, visible,
and desirable to different groups in society.
IV. (IN)EQUALITY IN ACCESS TO JUSTICE
THROUGH INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN

To explore how institutions of remedy shape how people handle
their civil justice problems, this Article contrasts the responses of
people facing similar kinds of problems in two different institutional
contexts. One context has the following characteristics: there are
several possible paths to the resolution of civil justice problems;
these paths are long-established, well-known, and available
throughout the country; many legal advice providers exist in addition
to lawyers; and a number of nonlegal sources of authoritative
resolution complement law. By comparison, the other context is
characterized by the following details: there are few routes to the
resolution of civil justice problems; many of these routes are
available only to people who live in particular cities or counties, as
some geographic areas have very little in the way of auxiliary
services; and few (if any) legal advisors exist aside from attorneys,
due to strong restrictions on who may give legal advice. Although
inequalities in access to justice appear in both of these societies, their
manifestations are shaped by the particular institutions of remedy
existing in each society.
This empirical analysis focuses on a group of civil justice
problems that are very common and that can be highly consequential
for the people who experience them, including the following money
and housing problems: "
" Difficulty paying rent or mortgages
* Receiving notice of eviction
* Facing foreclosure
" Concerns that property taxes are too high or incorrectly
assessed
* Belief that a landlord has unfairly withheld a security
deposit
54. See, e.g., GENN ET AL., supra note 5, at 83-84, 102-03 figs.3.2 & 3.3; LEGAL NEEDS
STUDY, supra note 10, tbl.3-3; PLEASENCE, supra note 13, at 104 fig.3.3; Currie, supra note 13,

tbl.2; Kritzer, supra note 13, at 879 fig.2, 896-98 figs.12, 13 & 14.
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*
"
"
"

Being unable to pay medical bills
Concerns about unpaid overtime or other wages
Trouble receiving pension or other benefit payments
Concerns that service providers (e.g., veterinarians,
doctors, hospitals) have over-charged 55
Empirical research on bankruptcy and household finances finds
that troubles with money and housing are tightly interlinked.5 6 The
successful resolution of these kinds of problems can make the
"difference between homelessness and penury on the one hand, and
stable housing, manageable cash flow and solid credit ratings on the
other."57 Although people across the populations of different market
democracies are at risk of encountering these kinds of problems,
different nations provide different routes to resolution. 58 Figure 3
illustrates this difference for the two common law contexts that this
Article described in abstract terms above: the United Kingdom and
the United States.
The United Kingdom provides a rich and diverse assortment of
institutions of remedy. " Law is one of these. To provide civil legal
aid over the past sixty years, the United Kingdom has employed an
expansive Judicare system in which the government subsidizes the
public's purchase of legal services from the private practice bar. 6
During most of this period, a majority of the population, including
both the working and middle classes, has been eligible for these
Judicare subsidies. 61
In addition to formal legal remedies, the United Kingdom also
has a multitude of formal nonlegal institutions of remedy, including
regulatory agencies and a number of government ombudsmen who
can address housing, local government, financial services, and health

55. See, e.g., Sandefur, supra note 7, at 121-22.
56. See Raisa Bahchieva et al., Mortgage Debt, Bankruptcy, and the Sustainability of Home
Ownership, in CREDIT MARKETS FOR THE POOR 73, 75 (Patrick Boulton & Howard Rosenthal
eds., 2005).
57. Sandefur, supra note 7, at 117.
58. See infra Part V.
59. See GENN ET AL., supra note 5, at 105-44.
60. See Paterson, supra note 30, at 126-27.
61.

See id. at 131 n.23; GRIFFITH, supra note 29; Regan, supra note 1, at 187 tbl.8.1.

964

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 42:949

services issues.62 Although not every type of ombudsman has the
power to bind the parties, several of these offices can provide
authoritative resolution to the public's problems. 63 To paraphrase the
words of the Financial Ombudsman Service, these offices are "the
official independent expert[s] in settling . . . complaints with the

power to put things right." '
Formal institutions of remedy are complemented by a set of
well-known, long-established, and nationally present advice
providers. Chief among these are the Citizens Advice Bureaux
("CABx"), 65 which provide advice about how to handle justice issues
and many other kinds of problems remotely over the Internet or
telephone, or personally at more than 3,000 locations around the
country. 66 Many local councils (city and county governments) have
their own advice services and offices of trading standards.67
According to a recent civil justice survey, these offices provided 15
percent of all successful advice contacts for the public's civil justice
problems. 68 The CABx and other services that exist to assist the
public in solving its justice problems have an important power: they
may dispense legal advice. 69 While the legal profession still retains
the sole right of appearance in some forums, various nonlegal
professionals can and do dispense advice about when and how to use
law to respond to justice problems. "

62. See Citizens Advice Bureau, Advice Guide, How to Use an Ombudsman in England,
http://www.adviceguide.org.uk/nm/index/your rights/civil-rights/how-to-use-an ombudsman.ht
m (last visited Sept. 13, 2009).
63. Id.
64. Financial Ombudsman Service, Home Page, http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/
default.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2009).
65. See John Baldwin, The Role of the Citizens'Advice Bureaux and the Law Centres in the
Provision of Legal Advice andAssistance, 8 CIV. JUST. Q. 24, 24-44 (1989).
66. See Citizens Advice Bureau, Citizens Advice, Key Facts, http://www.citizens
advice.org.uk/index/aboutus/factsheets/cab-key-facts.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2009).
67. See, e.g., City of Westminster Trading Standards, Home Page, http://www.trading
standards.gov.uk/westminster/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2009); Kent County Trading Standards,
Home Page, http://www.tradingstandards.gov.uk/kent/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2009); Lancashire
County Council Trading Standards, Home Page, http://www.tradingstandards.gov.uk/lancashire/
(last visited Sept. 15, 2009).
68. PLEASENCE, supra note 13, at 104 fig 3.3.
69. See Citizens Advice Bureau, supra note 65.
70. See Richard L. Abel, Comparative Sociology of the Legal Profession, in LAWYERS IN
SOCIETY: COMPARATIVE THEORIES 80, 106-07 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis eds.,

1989).
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COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS:
INSTITUTIONS OF REMEDY FOR CIVIL JUSTICE PROBLEMS
IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

United Kingdom

United States

Formal institutions of remedy

Formal institutions of remedy
" Law (with limited legal aid)

* Law (with expansive legal aid)

* Administrative agencies (local,
state, federal)

* Administrative agencies (local and

national)
o Government ombudsmen

Auxiliaries

Auxiliaries
* Strong lawyer monopoly on legal
advice
" Most auxiliaries are local, and not
available in all localities (e.g., city
landlord-tenant resource centers,
community mediation centers,
local media action lines, one's
city, state, or federal elected
representatives),

o Advice about how to use law and
handle justice problems provided
by many non-lawyer sources
*

Well-established, well-known
national advice providers (e.g.,
Citizens Advice Bureaux with
3,000+ locations)
Local resources are also available,
including community
organizations, elected
representatives, and local council
advice services.
Additional nationally available
resources include trade
organizations and professional
bodies.

" Nationally available resources
include the Better Business
Bureau and other trade
organizations and professional
bodies.

FIGURE 3
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The contrast between the United Kingdom and the United States
is stark: the United States provides the public with law, though not
much of it, and not much else.7 To illustrate, when Americans face
civil justice problems involving money or housing, they can go to
law. If they cannot afford to pay for lawyers' services, they can try
to turn to legal aid. However, the United States' legal aid system is a
limited one in comparative terms: 72 it serves only the poor.73
Further, relatively few legal aid providers are available for those
Americans who are eligible for civil legal aid.74 A study using data
from 1997 found that all sources of organized civil legal assistance
combined-including legal aid lawyers funded by local government,
state government, federal government, or private sources and lawyers
volunteering their services in organized pro bono programsprovided the equivalent of around one full-time lawyer for every five
thousand people eligible for civil legal aid. 7
If Americans do not go to law, they face relatively few
alternative means of remedy, and the availability of any alternatives
depends largely upon where they live. For authoritative resolution,
one option is turning to the complaint-handling offices of local, state,
or federal regulatory agencies for assistance with money and housing
problems. These agencies will sometimes investigate and resolve a
problem brought by a member of the public. 76 Beyond these
regulatory agencies, the availability of other means to resolution for
civil justice problems differs substantially from place to place. Some
communities have effective and well-known services that assist
people with specific types of problems, such as landlord-tenant
71. See supra Part IV; see also DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 24-46 (2004)
(criticizing the United States as having too much law for those who can afford it and too little for
everyone else); Deborah L. Rhode, Whatever Happened to Access to Justice?, 42 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 869, 877-91 (2009). See generally Mayhew, supra note 17 (arguing that the focus on
extending the availability of the legal system limits the effectiveness of potential reforms).
72. Regan, supra note 1, at 187 tbl.8.
73. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
74. Precisely how few is not known. Good information about the supply of legal aid is
scarce, as is unfortunately often the case with the answers to empirical questions about how the
U.S. civil justice system works for the public. See Jeanne Charn, Legal Services for All: Is the
Profession Ready?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1021, 1021-23 (2009); Rebecca L. Sandefur, Lawyers'
Pro Bono Service and Market-ReliantLegal Aid, in PUBLIC LAWYERS INTHE PRIVATE INTEREST:
THE EVOLVING ROLE OF PRO BONO IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 21-23 (Robert Granfield & Lynn
Mather eds., 2009).
75. Sandefur, supra note 73.
76. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
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resource centers or media consumer-action hotlines.77
Some
communities have clearinghouses or referral systems that attempt to
connect people with services that might help them with their
problems; other communities do not have these resources. 78 For
example, the United Way funds "2-1-1," a system of 244 regional
referral services around the country.79 Although many of these are
likely well-established, well-known, and expertly run, others may be
less so. 80 One limitation that characterizes such resources in every
part of the country, however, is that they typically cannot provide
legal advice. " In the United States, the legal profession maintains a
strong monopoly on the provision of advice about when and how to
use law to solve one's justice problems. 82
Members of the public who face civil justice problems in these
two countries thus have very different institutions of remedy
available to them. The United States provides law, administrative
agencies, and a patchwork of other resources that are limited in the
assistance they can provide with legal problems and are available
only in some localities.
The United Kingdom provides law,
administrative agencies, government ombudsmen, and highly visible,
nationally distributed auxiliary resources that can provide legal
advice as well as information and referrals.84 In the United
77. See, e.g., D.C. Bar, Landlord Tenant Resource Center, http://www.dcbar.org/for the.
public/programs-andservices/landlordtenant.cfm; Fair Housing Resource Center, Home Page,
http://www.fairhousingresourcecenter.org/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2009).
78. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Multifamily Housing
Clearinghouse, http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/mfli/hc/mfhc.cfm (last visited Sept. 15, 2009);
Welcome to LawHelpCalifornia.org, http://www.lawhelpcalifomia.org/ (last visited Sept. 15,
2009).
79. See United Way IAIRS, 2-1-1 US, Nationwide Status, http://www.21 Ius.org/status.htm
(last visited Sept. 13, 2009).
80. Although the United Way estimates that 78 percent of Americans have access to 2-1-1,
that percentage varies across the country. See UNITED WAY OF AMERICA, PERCENT OF
POPULATION COVERED BY 2-1-1 IN EACH STATE (2008), http://www.211 us.org/documents/2-1l%20Coverage%2OMap-Nov/o202008.pdf.
While there are many states with 100 percent
coverage, there are also states with less than 20 percent coverage. Id. The extent to which 2-1-1
service is available may serve as a rough proxy for its visibility and efficacy.
81. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-261 (2009); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6125
(Deering 2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.901 (2009). See generally JUSTINE FISCHER &
DOROTHY H. LACHMANN, UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE HANDBOOK: A COMPILATION OF
STATUTES, CASES, AND COMMENTARY ON THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW (1972)
(describing specific limitations on legal advice throughout the country).
82. See Abel, supra note 70, at n.47; Rhode, supra note 71, at 105-06.
83. See supra Part IV.
84. See supra Part IV.
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Kingdom, people experiencing justice problems face many entry
points into a rich network of remedy. In the United States, people
with similar problems face few entry points into a sparse network. 85
These differing institutional designs produce different patterns of
public problem solving.
In the United States, people respond to their money and housing
problems by choosing between what is broadly available: law or
nothing. 86 In the United Kingdom, where a much wider variety of
assistance with civil justice problems is available, people respond to
justiciable money and housing problems in a wider variety of ways. 87
Figure 4 illustrates this finding by reporting the actions that people
took in response to serious civil justice problems involving money or
housing. 88 The quantities in the graph are the shares of total reported
money and housing problems that people handled by (a) doing
nothing about that problem; (b) taking that problem to one or more
nonlegal third parties, whether for advice or authoritative resolution;
or (c) going to law, by consulting a lawyer or going to a court or
tribunal, whether in conjunction with other actions or not. 89 This
information is reported for two groups of people: (1) respondents to
the 1992 American Bar Association civil justice survey, who in this
analysis represent the experience of the American public with civil
justice problems;9" and (2) respondents to the 2004 England and
Wales Civil and Social Justice Survey, who here represent the
experience of the public in the United Kingdom. 9
The money and housing problems queried in both surveys were
carefully selected to be justiciable: they are problems that raise issues
in civil law, have civil legal aspects, and have consequences shaped
by civil law. 92 The specific problems analyzed in each survey are
similar, but not identical. In the data for the United States, the
specific problems included housing conditions (e.g., pests, repairs),

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See supra Part IV.
See infra fig.4 and accompanying text.
See infra fig.4 and accompanying text.
See infra fig.4 and accompanying text.
See infra fig.4 and accompanying text.
See LEGAL NEEDS STUDY, supra note 11.
PLEASENCE, supra note 13, at 104 fig.3.3.
See LEGAL NEEDS STUDY, supra note 10, at 5-6; PLEASENCE, supra note 13, at 5-10.
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A Comparison of How People Handle Civil Justice Problems
Involving Money and Housing:
United States (1992) and England and Wales (2004)
40%

35%
30%

25%

E3 United States,
1992

4.

20%

S15%
10%

-Wales,

[]10
England and
2004

5%
0%

Do Nothing

Non-legal
Third Party

Go to Law

Response to Civil Justice Problems
Data for the United States are based on 1,077 problems involving
housing, real property, personal finances, and consumer needs from a
sample of 3,087 households. The reference period for problems is one
year. 93 Data for England and Wales are based on 453 problems
involving livelihood, other sources of household income, housing
security, housing conditions, and debt and credit from a sample of 4,667
individuals. The reference period for problems is three years or since
the respondent turned eighteen. 94
FIGURE

93.

94.

4

LEGAL NEEDS STUDY, supra note 10.

ANDREW PHELPS ET AL., BRITISH MARKET RESEARCH BUREAU,
WELSH CIVIL AND SOCIAL JUSTICE SURVEY (2005).
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ENGLISH AND
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housing security (e.g., eviction, foreclosure), and personal finances
(e.g., bills, debts, credit). 95 The data for England and Wales included
similar categories of problems as well as problems with livelihood. 96
There are a number of other differences between the two surveys. 97
While perfect correspondence between the two surveys would have
been ideal, similarity is what we have to work with. These data do
not permit precise comparisons, but they do allow glimpses of an
overall pattern.
Figure 4 reveals a clear pattern of national difference in how
people respond to similar kinds of civil justice problems. In the
United States, where one's choices are broadly between law and
nothing, two responses account for a majority of civil justice money
and housing problems: people attempt to resolve them by turning to

law, or they take no action at all. As the solid bars of the graph
indicate, Americans responded to nearly a quarter (24 percent) of
money and housing problems by doing nothing. They took a similar
share (27 percent) of their civil justice money and housing problems
to law as a first, intermediate, or last resort. Only 8 percent of civil
justice problems involving money and housing were handled with
the assistance of a nonlegal third party: taken to administrative

95. See Sandefur, supra note 7, at tbl.l; LEGAL NEEDS STUDY, supra note 10, at 5-6.
96. See Sandefur, supra note 11, at tbl.2.
97. The two surveys differed in the following ways:
"

The U.S. survey sampled households, while the survey in England and Wales
sampled individuals.

"

Socioeconomic groups are defined in different ways in the two surveys: by
income in the United States and by occupation in England and Wales.

"

The England and Wales survey was comprehensive, while the United States
survey covered only the lowest-eaming 80 percent of the population.

"

The U.S. survey was administered over the telephone, while the survey in
England and Wales was administered in person.

"

In the U.S. survey, respondents reported about
during the past year, while the respondents
Wales reported about problems encountered
since they had turned eighteen, whichever was

"

Both working and non-working respondents are included in the data from the
two surveys, but the non-working populations likely differ in some ways.

"

The two surveys were conducted in different years: 1992 in the United States
and 2004 in England and Wales.

problems they had experienced
to the survey in England and
during the past three years or
most recent.

Further, data at the individual level for the United States are not available, so one is left with only
the published tabulations as data for the present analysis. See LEGAL NEEDS STUDY, supra note
10, at 5-6; PLEASENCE, supra note 13, at 5-10.
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agencies, local government, the Better Business Bureau, community
organizations, elected representatives, or other nonlegal third parties
for assistance. "
In the very different institutional context of the United
Kingdom, people handled similar problems in different ways. As the
hatched bars of the graph indicate, only a small share of money and
housing problems were handled by doing nothing (5 percent). In
contrast with the United States, few money and housing problems
were taken to lawyers, courts, or tribunals (10 percent). On the other
hand, in England and Wales, the public frequently took its civil
justice problems with money and housing to nonlegal third-party
advice providers, administrative agencies, and ombudsmen: 37
percent of problems were handled in this way, which is more than
four times the share of money and housing problems taken to
nonlegal third parties in the United States.99
Institutions of remedy not only receive clients, they also create
their clienteles. "' In a context where nonlegal third parties are wellestablished and empowered to provide authoritative resolution and
legal advice, a large clientele exists for these parties even when there
is legal aid available to support the purchase of private practice legal
services. 10 In a context where nonlegal third parties are few,
unevenly distributed around the country, and limited in the services
they can provide by restrictions on who may give legal advice, fewer
people turn to them for help with justice problems. 02
Institutions of remedy not only shape what people do about
justice problems, but also shape group differences in what people do.
In both the United States and the United Kingdom, one observes
social class inequalities in access to justice: different socioeconomic
98. The household handled the remaining problems by taking some action on its own, such
as trying to work out a solution with another party involved in the problem. See generally
Sandefur, supra note 7.
99. As in the United States study, the respondents handled the remaining problems by taking
an action that did not involve any assistance from a third party. See generally Sandefur, supra
note 11.
100. This dual dynamic of client reception and client generation occurs both at the
institutional level and at the level of the individual organizations that compose institutions of

remedy. For example, as Mayhew notes, "Any given legal agency, be it a private law firm, a
neighborhood law office, or a civil rights commission, in part receives and in part generates a
clientele." Mayhew, supra note 15, at 403.
101. See id.
102. See id.
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groups or social classes handle similar civil justice problems in
different ways. 103 But the character of this inequality is different in
the two countries. Figures 5 and 6 report on how socioeconomic
differences affect the public's responses to money and housing
problems in the United States and the United Kingdom, respectively.
The quantities in the figures are odds ratios, which indicate the
magnitude and direction of the difference in the likelihood that two
different socioeconomic groups handle their problems in a particular
way. 104 When an odds ratio is 1.0, there is no difference between the
two groups; the odds of taking a given action in one group are the
same as in the other group. 105 When an odds ratio is larger than 1.0,
this indicates that one group is more likely to take the action than the
comparison group. 106 When an odds ratio is smaller than 1.0, one
group is less likely to take the action than is the comparison group. 107
As figure 5 reports, American poor households are only half as
likely (odds ratio = 0.50) as American moderate-income households
to take their problems to nonlegal third parties, and 39 percent less
likely (odds ratio = 0.61) to take their problems to lawyers. In favor
of legal or nonlegal third party assistance, American poor households
often take no action to resolve money and housing problems; in the
United States, poor households are twice as likely (odds ratio = 2.0)
to do nothing about civil justice problems involving money or
housing as are moderate-income households. "' In the American
context, more people are likely to do nothing about serious problems,
and poor people are especially likely to do nothing. 109
103. See Sandefur, supra note 7, at 114-17 (finding that poor households in the United States
are less likely than non-poor households to seek advice or help in resolving justice problems); cf
Kritzer, supra note 13, at 876-77 (proposing that the type of problem, not the characteristics of
the person, is the major predictor of whether a person will seek the aid of a lawyer). See
generally Sandefur, supra note 6, at 346-49 (reviewing evidence from several countries about
social class differences in how people handle civil justice problems).
104. An odds ratio is a measure of the difference between two probabilities. Odds are
calculated as [p/(l - p)], where p is the observed probability of taking an action in the income
group. An odds ratio is the ratio of two odds. See ALAN AGRESTI, CATEGORICAL DATA
ANALYSIS 14-16 (1990).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. In this study, low- and moderate-income households were found to be about equally
likely to handle problems by taking action on their own, without third-party assistance or advice.
See Sandefur, supra note 7, at tbl. 1.
109. Id.
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SOCIOECONOMIC DIFFERENCES IN RESPONSES TO CIVIL JUSTICE
PROBLEMS INVOLVING MONEY AND HOUSING:
ODDS RATIOS BY HOUSEHOLD INCOME,
UNITED STATES, 1992
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Response to Civil Justice Problems
Data for the United States are based on 1,077 problems involving
housing, real property, personal finances, and consumer needs from a
sample of 3,087 households. The reference period for problems is one
year. "Poor households" are those with incomes below 125 percent of
the federal poverty level. "Moderate-income households" are those
with incomes between 125 percent of the federal poverty level and
$60,000 per year in 1992 dollars. 110
FIGURE
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SOCIOECONOMIC DIFFERENCES IN RESPONSES TO CIVIL JUSTICE
PROBLEMS INVOLVING MONEY AND HOUSING:
ODDS RATIOS BY SOCIAL CLASS,
ENGLAND AND WALES, 2004
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Response to Civil Justice Problems
Data for England and Wales are based on 453 problems involving
livelihood, other sources of household income, housing security,
housing conditions, and debt and credit from a sample of 4,667
individuals. The reference period for problems is three years or since
the respondent turned eighteen.
The measure of socioeconomic
standing is social class as indexed by occupation, which is grouped into
three categories: (1) routine and manual occupations ("working class");
(2) intermediate occupations; and (3) professional and managerial
occupations ("professionals"). The figure compares the odds of each
response to civil justice problems by the working class to the odds of
each response to civil justice problems by professionals. I
FIGURE
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PHELPS ET AL., supra note 94.
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In the United Kingdom, one also observes that different
socioeconomic groups handle similar problems in different ways, but
the pattern of difference is not the same as in the United States. As
figure 4 illustrates, doing nothing is rare in England and Wales. As
figure 6 demonstrates, in England and Wales, doing nothing about a
problem is rare for both working class people and for professionals:
money and housing problems experienced by routine and manual
workers are only about 20 percent more likely (odds ratio = 1.21) to
be handled with inaction than are similar problems experienced by
people working in professional or managerial occupations. By
comparison, in the United States, poor households were 200 percent
more likely to do nothing than were moderate-income households.
Available data do not permit a more precise comparison, but these
two patterns are strikingly different.
Further inspection of the two figures reveals another difference
between the two institutional contexts. In the United States, poor
households were more likely than moderate-income households to do
nothing about their problems, and they were less likely to turn to any
kind of third party, whether legal or nonlegal. In England and
Wales, both routine and manual workers, and professional and
managerial workers were unlikely to do nothing about justice
problems; however, when these two groups took actions, they took
different actions. The money and housing problems of routine and
manual workers were 2.7 times more likely than similar problems
experienced by professional and managerial workers to go to
nonlegal third parties, such as advice services, ombudsmen, local
councils, members of parliament, and the like. On the other hand,
the money and housing problems of professional and managerial
workers were much more likely to go to law: routine and manual
workers' money and housing problems were only a third as likely to
go to law (odds ratio = .33) as were similar problems experienced by
professional and managerial workers.
Taking these findings together and acknowledging limitations in
the available data, I present the following interpretation as a
hypothesis. The United Kingdom's institutions of remedy are
relatively inclusive: they draw in a greater share of the population, so
everyone is likely to do something to try to resolve their justice
problems. On the other hand, the United States' institutions of
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remedy are relatively exclusive. They discourage action both in
general and on the part of certain groups-the poor in particular.
Institutions of remedy shape-or, more aptly, create-inequality
in access to substantive justice. By shaping how people handle their
justice problems, institutions shape both inequality in access to
different routes to solving justice problems and inequality in whether
or how those problems are resolved. How people handle their civil
justice problems bears a relationship to how those problems turn out.
Available evidence suggests that doing nothing about civil justice
problems can have

negative

consequences. " 2

For example,

Professor Dame Hazel Genn's landmark Paths to Justice study found
that when people did not seek advice about justice problems, those
problems were less likely to be resolved, whether through an
agreement between the parties or through an authoritative decision
by a third party like a court or an ombudsman. "' This finding held
controlling for other factors such as the type of problem, the remedy
the person sought for the problem, and the characteristics of the
person who had the problem, such as age, education, income, and
employment status. 114 Inequality in access to justice has the
potential to create social and economic inequality, because different
groups of people can experience different consequences from similar
justice problems. 115 Thus, we see a pattern in which existing
institutions of remedy can reproduce social inequality: inequality
comes in to institutions of remedy, and more inequality comes out
the other side.
V. CONCLUSION

A fulcrum point is where a lever pivots. 116 It is the central
support that makes the action of lifting a weight or moving a body
possible; where one places the support determines both how much
one can lift and how far that weight can be moved. 117 The fulcrum
112. GENN ET AL., supra note 5.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 281-82 tbl.B2; see also Geoff Mulherin & Christine Coumarelos, Access to Justice
and Disadvantaged Communities, in TRANSFORMING LivEs, supra note 7, at 9, 29 tbl.4;
Sandefur, supra note 6 (briefly reviewing research on the relationship between what people do
about their justice problems and how those problems turn out).
115. See generally Sandefur, supra note 6; Sandefur, supra note 11.
116. 24 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRJTrANICA 451 (15th ed. 1988).
117. Id.
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point in equalizing access to justice is institutional design. Greater
access to lawyers will unquestionably be part of expanded and
equalized access to justice. But, by stepping back from law, we can
examine additional opportunities to expand and equalize access to
substantive justice by selectively redesigning institutions of remedy.
We can begin to imagine institutions of remedy that are remedial and
give members of unequal groups in an unequal society more
common and more equal experiences with their justice problems.
This analysis, suggestive as it is, raises many questions. For
example, I have presented evidence that supports my argument that
institutions shape how people handle their problems, but of course,
other differences between the United States and the United Kingdom
may affect the outcomes I have examined. To what extent the
differences I have demonstrated are attributable to institutional
design or to other factors cannot be determined from the data that we
have at present. The scarcity of reliable, comparable information
gathered in a careful, systematic manner means that there are many
unanswered questions about what institutions of remedy do, how
they work, and how people interact with them. Recognizing what we
do not know should serve as an impetus for future empirical
research. Part of making access to justice "for everyone" will be
gaining better understanding about the impact of institutions of
remedy. 118
My analysis raises another set of questions that are emphatically
not empirical. For example, I have shown evidence that the United
Kingdom's institutions of remedy are more inclusive than those in
the United States. However, I have also shown that in that same
inclusive context with relatively generous legal aid, working-class
people are less likely than professional people to take their money
and housing problems to law. Is this acceptable? Is it a good thing
that the working class may have its own institutions of remedy, while
professionals and managers prefer the legal system? Should we be
deeply concerned? Is one country's unequal pattern better than
another's? No amount of carefully collected data or sophisticated
empirical analysis can provide an answer to these kinds of questions
because they are ultimately not questions about facts: they are
questions about values. In a democracy, values questions are
118.

See Charn, supra note 74, at 1044-57; Sandefur, supra note 72, at 19-22.
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appropriately the terrain of the people who have to live with the
system that reflects and enacts those values. These people include
not only our scholarly selves, but also the public and its
representatives. In addition to learning more about how these
institutions work, we should be spending much more time soliciting
the input of the many and diverse members of the public about what
they need and want when they face civil justice problems.

